According to WPB, Saudi Arabia has resumed crude-oil loadings from the Red Sea port of Yanbu after partial repairs to the damaged East–West Pipeline, marking a significant operational step beyond the pipeline restart reported earlier in September. The system is now moving around 3.5 million barrels per day, restoring a major export route that allows Saudi crude to reach the Red Sea without passing through the Strait of Hormuz.
The distinction between pipeline restart and export restart is important. Saudi Arabia began pumping oil through the East–West system earlier in the month after repairs and pressure testing, but crude was initially directed toward storage and Red Sea refineries while sufficient volumes were accumulated at Yanbu. As of September 24, crude tanker loading had still not resumed despite several vessels being scheduled to call at the terminal. The start of actual vessel loading over the following weekend therefore represents a new and measurable stage of the recovery.
Only a limited number of tankers were initially loading at Yanbu, indicating that operations remain in a partial recovery phase. The approximately 3.5 million bpd pipeline throughput should also not be interpreted as 3.5 million bpd of exports from Yanbu because part of the crude moving west is being supplied to domestic refineries along the Red Sea coast. The precise export volume will depend on how much crude is retained for domestic processing, terminal inventories and the pace at which tanker loading increases.
The current throughput nevertheless represents a substantial recovery from the low-rate restart seen immediately after the pipeline returned to operation. Before the latest disruption, Saudi Arabia had been using the East–West system to reroute roughly 4 million bpd of crude away from Hormuz, while the pipeline itself has a maximum capacity of around 7 million bpd. The present 3.5 million bpd rate therefore restores a large share of the route’s recent operational role, although it remains well below maximum design capacity.
The pipeline was shut after drone attacks damaged three of its pumping stations in mid-September and brought crude loadings at Yanbu to a halt. The outage removed Saudi Arabia’s most important physical bypass to Hormuz at a time when shipping through the Strait was already constrained, forcing the kingdom to redirect much larger volumes toward Gulf terminals and rely more heavily on tanker movements through Hormuz and ship-to-ship transfers off Oman.
That rerouting changed the regional tanker market within days. Saudi crude flows through Hormuz rose sharply during September, while more than 60 million barrels were marketed for transfer off Sohar during September and October. The increase added Saudi volumes to an STS system already handling crude from Iraq, the UAE and other producers, eventually pushing Gulf of Oman transfer activity toward its practical operating limits.
The consequences were visible in both vessel availability and freight. STS cycles that previously required around five to seven days stretched toward 10 days as queues developed for transfer windows, tugboats, personnel and equipment. The daily equivalent earnings for VLCCs carrying Middle Eastern crude toward China climbed to around $1.27 million at the peak of the squeeze, demonstrating how quickly an infrastructure disruption on land translated into higher maritime costs.
The resumption of Yanbu exports therefore matters not only because Saudi Arabia has recovered another outlet for its crude but because it could begin reversing some of the exceptional pressure created elsewhere in the logistics system. Every barrel sent west through the East–West Pipeline rather than east toward Gulf terminals reduces the amount of Saudi crude that potentially needs to pass through Hormuz and use the congested transfer network off Oman.
At 3.5 million bpd, the theoretical scale of that relief is substantial, although the actual effect will depend on how much pipeline crude is exported rather than processed domestically and how quickly Yanbu loading activity expands. If tanker departures from Yanbu continue to increase, Saudi requirements for Gulf shuttle operations and Oman STS capacity could begin to decline from the extraordinary levels seen during the second half of September.
The change is particularly relevant because congestion off Oman had started forcing buyers and sellers to examine transfer points farther east. Locations off India’s west coast and Malaysia were being considered as alternatives, but moving STS operations farther from the Gulf requires more vessel time and can sharply increase the number of VLCCs required to move the same daily volume. A sustained Yanbu recovery would reduce the need to expand these longer and less efficient logistics chains.
The latest development does not mean that the Gulf of Oman bottleneck will disappear immediately. Large volumes of Saudi crude have already been committed to Gulf and Oman routes, and cargo schedules cannot be reversed instantly. Iraq, the UAE and other producers also continue to use the regional STS network, meaning transfer infrastructure will remain busy even if Saudi demand for it begins to ease.
Freight conditions are also unlikely to normalize immediately. Tankers that have been repositioned toward the Middle East, vessels already committed to shuttle operations and ships waiting in transfer queues will require time to return to normal trading patterns. The exceptionally high freight environment developed over several weeks, and a partial pipeline recovery does not automatically release all of that capacity at once.
The market is therefore entering a transition rather than returning immediately to pre-disruption conditions. Saudi Arabia now has two functioning export directions again: crude can move east toward Gulf terminals and Hormuz or west through the East–West Pipeline to Yanbu. Restoring that flexibility is strategically more important than the 3.5 million bpd figure alone because it allows the kingdom to rebalance flows between two maritime systems according to security, freight and customer requirements.
The East–West Pipeline was designed precisely for this type of strategic flexibility. The system connects Saudi production areas in the Eastern Province with the Red Sea coast and was capable of reaching 7 million bpd earlier in 2026 when Hormuz disruption forced the kingdom to maximize alternative export routes. Its ability to operate at high rates made Yanbu one of the most important relief valves in the global oil system during periods of restricted Gulf shipping.
The September attacks demonstrated the vulnerability of that strategy. Once the pipeline was damaged, Saudi Arabia did not lose crude production capacity in the same proportion, but it lost the ability to move a large share of those barrels efficiently to the Red Sea. The oil therefore had to compete for scarce Gulf tanker capacity and STS infrastructure, demonstrating that export-route availability can be as important as production itself when assessing the amount of crude that can actually reach international buyers.
The restart has already had an effect on market expectations because it reduces the probability that all incremental Saudi exports will continue to depend on Hormuz and Oman. Oil prices initially came under downward pressure when signs emerged that the pipeline and Yanbu were returning, although broader Middle East supply risks have continued to keep crude prices elevated and volatile.
There are still important limitations to the recovery. The current 3.5 million bpd throughput is approximately half of the pipeline’s 7 million bpd maximum capacity, and a full restoration of damaged pumping infrastructure is still expected to require additional time. Only a limited number of tankers were loading immediately after exports resumed, so the system has not yet demonstrated that it can sustain the high loading rates seen before the attack.
The security risk has also not disappeared simply because the pipeline is operating again. Yanbu provides a bypass around Hormuz, but crude leaving the Red Sea for Asian customers may still face routing risks around Bab el-Mandeb, while the pipeline and associated pumping infrastructure remain exposed to further attacks. The restored route therefore improves Saudi export flexibility without eliminating the wider regional security premium.
For European buyers, the return of Yanbu is particularly relevant because Red Sea exports provide a geographically different supply route from barrels moving through Hormuz and the Indian Ocean. Some European refiners faced disruption to October Saudi crude allocations after the pipeline outage, and a sustained restoration could improve Saudi Arabia’s ability to rebuild term deliveries and reduce the need for customers to secure replacement barrels elsewhere.
For Asian buyers, the effect is more mixed. Some Yanbu cargoes may still travel east through Bab el-Mandeb toward Asian markets, while other Saudi barrels can continue loading from Gulf terminals. The key improvement is optionality: Aramco can once again choose between eastern and western export systems rather than concentrating an unusually large share of its crude on the Hormuz-Oman corridor.
This flexibility could gradually reduce vessel demand around the Gulf. During the peak of the diversion, the additional Saudi flows through Hormuz were estimated to require dozens of extra VLCCs, while longer STS cycles reduced the effective availability of vessels already in the region. Moving several million barrels per day back toward Yanbu could eventually release part of this shipping pressure, although the relationship will not be immediate or one-for-one.
For the bitumen market, the impact remains indirect and should not be presented as evidence of higher bitumen production or lower bitumen prices. The East–West Pipeline principally changes the routing of Saudi crude, and there is currently no measurable evidence that the Yanbu restart has increased Middle Eastern bitumen output or directly expanded bitumen cargo availability.
The logistics implications are nevertheless relevant. Reduced Saudi reliance on Hormuz and Gulf of Oman STS operations could free some anchorage capacity, marine services and broader tanker resources in a region where congestion has recently become extreme. This may gradually improve the operating environment for other petroleum cargoes, including the scheduling of vessels serving regional bitumen and fuel-oil trades, even though bulk bitumen typically moves on specialized heated vessels rather than VLCCs.
The same caution applies to freight. A reduction in crude tanker pressure does not automatically translate into an equivalent decline in bitumen freight because vessel classes, routes and commercial structures differ. However, a less congested Gulf marine system can reduce some of the indirect costs associated with waiting time, port scheduling and competition for supporting services, which can eventually influence the delivered economics of petroleum products.
For bitumen buyers in India, East Africa and Southeast Asia, the most relevant indicators will therefore be actual vessel waiting times, loading reliability and regional freight assessments rather than the pipeline throughput figure alone. If Yanbu continues ramping up and Oman congestion eases, the logistics premium embedded in Gulf petroleum movements could begin to soften. That would be a shipping development first, not evidence of a change in physical bitumen fundamentals.
The next few days will be important in determining whether the restart becomes a sustained recovery. Tanker departures from Yanbu will show whether loading activity is expanding beyond the initial handful of vessels, while pipeline throughput will indicate whether Saudi Arabia can move from approximately 3.5 million bpd toward the 4 million bpd range that the system was carrying before the shutdown.
A further increase would strengthen the case that Yanbu is once again functioning as a major export outlet rather than merely operating in a testing and stabilization phase. Conversely, if throughput remains around current levels or new technical problems emerge, Saudi Arabia may still need to maintain unusually high crude movements through Hormuz and STS operations off Oman.
The latest development therefore closes one stage of the September disruption but not the entire episode. Saudi Arabia has progressed from a damaged pipeline, to low-rate pumping, to inventory rebuilding at Yanbu and now to the resumption of actual tanker loading. Each step has restored part of the kingdom’s export flexibility, but full normalization will require sustained pipeline throughput, a larger number of successful Yanbu loadings and a measurable easing of the congestion created in the Gulf of Oman.
For the regional bitumen market, WPB assesses the development as positive for logistics but not yet as a direct change in bitumen supply. If Yanbu continues operating near or above the current 3.5 million bpd rate and Saudi crude diversions through Hormuz decline, the strongest near-term effect should be reduced pressure on tanker availability, STS infrastructure and freight rather than a direct change in refinery bitumen production.
By WPB
Saudi Arabia crude exports, Yanbu oil exports, East-West Pipeline, Saudi Aramco, Petroline, Yanbu crude terminal, Red Sea oil exports, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman STS, VLCC availability, tanker freight, Saudi crude, oil shipping, Middle East logistics, bitumen freight, Gulf bitumen, Red Sea shipping, crude supply
