According to WPB, two tanker incidents reported off northern Oman on August 1 have added a new layer of risk to commercial shipping at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz. The incidents did not close the waterway and no major pollution was reported, but their locations are commercially significant. Both occurred near the Musandam Peninsula, where vessels entering or leaving the Gulf must operate within a narrow maritime corridor already affected by military tension, restricted traffic and higher insurance requirements.
In the first incident, a tanker was struck by an unidentified projectile approximately 11 nautical miles northeast of Lima, Oman. The impact damaged the vessel’s engine room and left the tanker without effective command. No casualties or environmental damage were reported in the initial assessment. A second tanker later reported a large splash and an explosion close to the vessel about 21 nautical miles northeast of Khasab. The second ship did not report damage, but the event was serious enough to trigger another maritime security warning.
Lima and Khasab are located on Oman’s Musandam Peninsula at the southern entrance to Hormuz. This means the incidents did not occur at a distant point in the Arabian Sea or along an optional diversion route. They occurred close to the approach used by ships moving between Gulf export terminals and the Gulf of Oman. For tanker operators, the distinction is important because vessels cannot avoid the area without abandoning a Gulf voyage entirely.
The identity of those responsible for the two incidents had not been independently established at the time of publication. The projectile in the first case was officially described as unidentified, while the second report confirmed only an explosion and splash near the tanker. It would therefore be premature to assign responsibility or describe both events as confirmed missile attacks. Their commercial effect, however, does not depend entirely on attribution. Insurers and shipowners respond to the probability of damage, crew injury and operational loss even when the origin of an attack remains uncertain.
The incidents follow several weeks of tanker attacks and suspicious activity near Oman and the southern Hormuz corridor. Earlier events included vessels struck near Limah, Kumzar, Dibba and Khor Fakkan, some of which suffered engine-room fires, steering damage or crew evacuation. Two managed tankers were hit on July 20 while using the southern route, including a vessel that had been scheduled to load oil products in the Gulf. This pattern has already reduced confidence in the maritime routes promoted as safer alternatives during the conflict.
The latest incidents matter to the bitumen trade because the entrance to Hormuz is not only a transit point for crude oil and liquefied natural gas. It is also the unavoidable maritime outlet for most bulk bitumen loaded at terminals in Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and ports inside the United Arab Emirates. A bitumen tanker travelling to India, East Africa, Southeast Asia or China must first leave the Gulf through this corridor unless the product is moved overland to a terminal outside the strait.
Bitumen shipping is especially sensitive to disruption because it relies on a relatively small specialized fleet. The product must remain heated during transport and requires vessels equipped with insulated tanks, heating coils, suitable pumps and dedicated cargo-handling systems. A conventional clean-product tanker cannot always replace a delayed bitumen vessel. When one specialized ship is damaged, detained or withdrawn by its owner, the loss can affect several scheduled cargoes rather than a single voyage.
The first Oman incident illustrates this operational exposure. Damage to an engine room can leave a tanker unable to maneuver even when its cargo tanks remain intact. A vessel without command near the entrance to Hormuz can require tug assistance, security coordination, technical inspection and an approved anchorage before repairs begin. If the ship is carrying hot bitumen, heating systems and onboard power must remain reliable to prevent the cargo from cooling beyond the normal pumping range. A prolonged machinery failure can therefore turn a navigation incident into a cargo-handling problem.
Even when no ship is hit, nearby explosions affect future sailings. Shipowners may delay departure, request naval guidance or wait for daylight transit windows. Crews may require additional security briefings, and charter parties may need to be amended before a vessel enters the area. War-risk insurers can shorten the validity of quotations or demand notification for each passage. These measures increase waiting time and reduce the number of voyages a tanker can complete within a month.
For bitumen buyers, the first consequence may be reduced reliability rather than an immediate physical shortage. A supplier can have product available in storage while being unable to confirm a loading date because the nominated vessel has not received approval to enter the Gulf. Buyers working under CFR contracts may see quotations withdrawn or revised before confirmation. Under FOB arrangements, the purchaser may secure the product but still be unable to nominate an acceptable ship.
The risk is amplified by the decline in normal tanker movement around Hormuz. During July, the number of commodity vessels crossing the strait fell to a small fraction of pre-conflict levels. On one particularly restricted day, only three commodity vessels completed the passage, compared with about 125 vessel movements per day before the war. The decline included interruptions to crude, fuel oil, LPG and other product flows.
Ship-to-ship transfers in the Gulf of Oman had partly reduced the need for large tankers to enter the strait. Smaller or specially cleared ships moved cargo through Hormuz and transferred it to vessels waiting outside. That arrangement helped maintain some Gulf exports, but the activity slowed after earlier attacks near Oman. Satellite observations reviewed in July showed only limited transfer operations, while maritime sources estimated that only a few transfers had taken place over several days.
The August 1 incidents may make this system more difficult. The Gulf of Oman and the Musandam approaches had been used as operating areas for waiting ships, transfer operations and vessels preparing for Hormuz passage. If the perceived risk expands from the interior of the strait to these external waters, tankers cannot fully reduce their exposure simply by remaining outside the Gulf. Transfer vessels, support craft and receiving tankers may all face additional security and insurance requirements.
For Iranian bitumen exporters, this could widen the difference between the price quoted at the terminal and the final cost paid by overseas buyers. Freight may include higher war-risk premiums, security expenses, longer waiting periods and compensation demanded by owners for entering the area. Demurrage exposure also increases when a ship reaches the region but cannot proceed to the loading terminal. A low FOB price may therefore lose its advantage once the complete delivered cost is calculated.
Iraqi and other Gulf suppliers may face similar pressure even when their cargoes are not connected to Iran. Maritime risk is assessed by location, route and vessel exposure, not only by cargo origin. A tanker loading in Basra must still cross the same southern Hormuz approaches. Product moving from Kuwait, Bahrain or Qatar also depends on the waterway. The two incidents therefore strengthen the possibility of a regional freight premium affecting several exporting countries at the same time.
The immediate effect on Asian markets will depend on existing inventories. Importers in India, China and Southeast Asia with adequate storage may delay purchases until freight conditions become clearer. Buyers with low stocks or fixed road-project commitments may have to accept higher delivered prices or purchase from alternative origins. This can redirect demand toward South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Turkey and Mediterranean suppliers, placing pressure on available vessels and loading capacity outside the Gulf.
East African markets may be particularly exposed because many buyers depend on imported bulk or drum bitumen and have fewer nearby supply alternatives. Longer sailing routes, smaller parcel sizes and limited storage can make freight increases more visible in the delivered price. Delays can also affect asphalt-plant schedules and public road contracts, especially where contractors cannot easily substitute one grade or packaging method for another.
The incidents may also encourage further use of overland and bypass routes. The UAE can move part of its onshore crude production to Fujairah through a pipeline outside Hormuz, but this infrastructure does not directly transport paving-grade bitumen. Bitumen requires heated storage and dedicated transfer equipment. Similar limitations apply to proposals involving pipelines or Mediterranean outlets. Alternative routes can reduce dependence on Hormuz only when the full product-handling system is available.
The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the world’s most important energy passages. Historical data show that oil flows through the route have represented about one-fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption and approximately one-quarter of maritime oil trade. Existing bypass pipelines can move only part of the volume that normally uses the strait. Product-specific supply chains, including bitumen, have even fewer alternatives.
The two incidents off Oman do not establish that all tanker traffic will stop. The second vessel was not damaged, the first reported no casualties, and no major environmental impact was initially recorded. Their importance lies in geography and timing. They occurred at the entrance to the waterway after repeated attacks had already reduced traffic and slowed offshore transfer operations.
For the bitumen market, the principal concern is that risk is no longer confined to a single point inside Hormuz. It now covers the approach waters where vessels wait, organize transfers and prepare to enter or leave the Gulf. This can increase insurance costs, reduce the availability of specialized tankers and make loading schedules less dependable. The market may continue to receive cargoes, but the cost and timing of those cargoes will be more difficult to guarantee.
The next indicators will be whether the damaged tanker regains control, whether additional incidents are reported near Musandam, and whether shipowners suspend Gulf nominations. Bitumen traders should also monitor tanker waiting times, the validity period of freight offers, changes in war-risk cover and the number of specialized vessels entering the strait. These operational signals may provide a clearer assessment of supply conditions than daily movements in crude oil prices.
By WPB
News, Bitumen, Strait of Hormuz, Oman, Tanker Security, Maritime Risk, Freight, War-Risk Insurance, Gulf Shipping, Asphalt Supply
