According to WPB, the sharp decline in vessel movements through both the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb indicates that the Middle East shipping crisis is no longer concentrated around one maritime chokepoint. The Red Sea, which had served as Saudi Arabia’s principal alternative to disrupted Persian Gulf exports, is now facing its own security and routing constraints. On August 5, only two vessels were recorded crossing Hormuz, while just one commodity vessel passed through Bab el-Mandeb. At the same time, Yemen’s Houthis claimed missile attacks against two Saudi oil tankers, one near the Red Sea port of Yanbu and another in the Gulf of Aden. Saudi authorities had not independently confirmed either incident at the time of publication.
The traffic figures represent an operational collapse rather than a routine reduction. Before the regional conflict began, approximately 130 to 140 vessels normally passed through Hormuz each day. The two recorded transits on August 5 consisted of one vessel entering and another leaving the waterway. At Bab el-Mandeb, traffic fell from 20 commodity vessels on August 4 to only one Bahamas-flagged dry-bulk carrier on August 5. Public tracking data may not capture every ship, particularly when vessels reduce or suspend electronic transmissions, but the difference from normal activity remains too large to be explained by tracking gaps alone.
The significance extends beyond the number of ships. Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb are connected components of the same energy-trading system. Cargoes leaving the Persian Gulf for Europe normally pass through Hormuz, cross the Arabian Sea, enter the Red Sea through Bab el-Mandeb and continue toward the Suez Canal. Saudi Arabia can bypass Hormuz by moving crude west through its East–West Pipeline to Yanbu, but eastbound cargoes loaded at Yanbu still depend on Bab el-Mandeb to reach Asian buyers by the shortest route. When traffic through both gateways falls at the same time, rerouting becomes more expensive and substantially less efficient.
Yanbu became considerably more important after restrictions at Hormuz reduced Saudi Arabia’s ability to use its Gulf export terminals normally. The East–West Pipeline can carry crude from eastern production areas to the Red Sea coast, with up to approximately 5 million barrels per day available for export under expanded operating conditions. This allowed Saudi Arabia to shift large volumes away from the Persian Gulf and preserve access to international buyers. The strategy, however, transferred more export dependence to a single Red Sea corridor exposed to Houthi missiles, drones and routing threats.
The pressure is already visible in loading data. Crude loadings at Yanbu averaged approximately 3.8 million barrels per day between April and June but declined to around 3 million barrels per day after July 20. Some tankers have loaded with their Automatic Identification System transponders switched off, while others have moved north toward the Suez Canal or increased their use of Egypt’s SUMED pipeline rather than sailing south through Bab el-Mandeb.
Turning off AIS can reduce the publicly visible electronic information available to an attacker, and maritime security advice has recommended reducing electronic exposure for vessels associated with Saudi ports. It also creates additional commercial uncertainty. Charterers, terminals, insurers, lenders and buyers depend on vessel-position data to estimate arrival times, confirm routing and coordinate loading and discharge operations. Reduced visibility can complicate compliance screening, inventory planning and the calculation of potential delays, even when the decision is made for legitimate security reasons.
Rerouting through Suez does not provide a simple solution for eastbound shipments. A vessel loaded at Yanbu for Asia can move north through the Suez Canal, enter the Mediterranean and then sail around the Cape of Good Hope before turning toward the Indian Ocean. This avoids Bab el-Mandeb but can add approximately 30 days to the voyage. One products tanker carrying about 500,000 barrels of naphtha from Yanbu to Japan adopted this route after security conditions deteriorated in the southern Red Sea.
The SUMED pipeline offers a more efficient northbound option for some crude oil. It links the Red Sea with the Mediterranean and has a capacity of approximately 2.5 million barrels per day. However, it is a crude-oil pipeline, not a universal route for petroleum products. It cannot transport finished bitumen, fuel oil grades, packaged asphalt materials or other products requiring segregated and heated handling. Its greater use may reduce pressure on some crude tankers, but it does not create a corresponding bypass for the bitumen market.
This distinction is essential when assessing whether the Red Sea remains a practical alternative for bitumen. A crude barrel can be moved through a cross-country pipeline, transferred to another terminal and loaded into a different tanker. Bulk bitumen must remain a segregated physical product and is normally transported in specialized vessels with insulated cargo tanks, heating systems and pumps designed for highly viscous material. Cargoes such as bitumen require heating to remain pumpable, which limits the number of vessels that can provide the service.
Longer routes also create costs that are more significant for bitumen than for many conventional petroleum cargoes. A bitumen carrier must continue heating its cargo throughout an extended voyage. Additional sailing days increase bunker consumption, crew costs, insurance exposure and the time during which the vessel is unavailable for another fixture. A diversion that adds several weeks does not affect only one shipment; it reduces the effective capacity of the entire specialized fleet because each ship completes fewer voyages over the same period.
Insurance may remain one of the largest obstacles even when no physical damage is independently confirmed. Marine war-risk coverage is generally arranged separately from standard hull and cargo insurance, and insurers can apply geographic restrictions, short quotation periods and cancellation provisions. Recent market indications for vessels operating around Hormuz, the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf have increased sharply, while cargo war-risk premiums for the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden have also remained elevated. Rates vary according to vessel ownership, trading history, flag, cargo, destination and perceived political exposure.
The claimed attacks near Yanbu and in the Gulf of Aden may therefore influence pricing even without independent Saudi confirmation. Underwriters and shipowners respond not only to verified damage but also to the probability of attack, the credibility of threats and observed changes in commercial routing. The collapse in Bab el-Mandeb traffic provides evidence that companies are already modifying behavior. A single recorded transit after 20 the previous date suggests that many operators considered waiting or rerouting commercially preferable to continuing through the southern gateway.
Crew safety will also affect vessel availability. Shipowners cannot evaluate a voyage solely through the size of the freight premium. Masters and crews must be willing to enter the area, and companies must prepare voyage-specific security plans based on the latest threat information. International maritime authorities have recently warned operators to conduct thorough risk assessments before using the Red Sea and have emphasized that renewed attacks endanger seafarers, shipping security and the stability of global supply chains.
For Saudi Arabia, the immediate issue is whether Yanbu can continue functioning as a reliable export substitute rather than merely an operational loading port. The terminal may remain capable of loading crude and products, but export capacity has limited commercial value when ships are unwilling to approach, transmit their positions or continue through the intended route. A port can be technically open while its effective capacity falls because vessels arrive irregularly, cargoes are delayed and owners demand exceptional compensation.
For the regional bitumen market, the consequences extend beyond Saudi-origin material. Iranian, Iraqi, Kuwaiti, Bahraini and UAE cargoes loaded inside the Persian Gulf must first secure passage through Hormuz. Shipments intended for Europe or the Mediterranean may then depend on Bab el-Mandeb and Suez. A cargo that successfully leaves the Gulf can therefore encounter a second security barrier before reaching its destination.
Avoiding Bab el-Mandeb normally means sailing around the Cape of Good Hope. For bitumen moving from the Gulf to Europe, this adds distance, heating requirements and vessel time. For smaller cargoes, the additional cost per metric ton can become especially high because the voyage expenses are distributed across less volume. Shipowners may also prefer larger or higher-value fixtures when risk and vessel time increase, leaving smaller bitumen buyers with fewer nominations.
East African buyers may face some of the most immediate pressure. Markets along the region’s eastern coastline commonly receive petroleum products from the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and Asian suppliers. Disruption at Hormuz reduces access to Gulf-origin cargoes, while insecurity around Bab el-Mandeb limits southbound movements from Yanbu and northbound movements toward the Red Sea. Buyers may have to compete for cargoes arriving from more distant Asian or Mediterranean origins, increasing delivered prices even when refinery values remain unchanged.
India and other Asian markets also face a more complicated supply calculation. Saudi cargoes loaded at Yanbu can reach Asia quickly only by passing south through Bab el-Mandeb. If owners refuse that route, the alternatives involve a major diversion or waiting for security conditions to improve. Gulf-origin bitumen remains geographically closer to India, but it is exposed to Hormuz. The loss of both normal options could increase demand for South Korean, Singaporean, Malaysian or other Asian supply.
European buyers may initially appear to benefit from more Saudi crude and products moving north through Suez. However, the opportunity is uneven. SUMED can support crude flows, while bitumen must remain aboard a suitable vessel or be transferred through terminals with heated and segregated infrastructure. If more tankers choose the northern route to avoid Bab el-Mandeb, competition for Suez transit, Mediterranean storage, ship availability and port services may intensify.
Packaged bitumen does not eliminate the risk. Drummed material, jumbo bags and containerized cargoes can travel on general cargo or container services and do not require a specialized heated tanker for the complete voyage. They remain exposed to route diversions, container shortages, longer transit periods, higher freight rates and disruption to scheduled services. A carrier avoiding the Red Sea may add substantial time by sailing around Africa, affecting delivery schedules for road projects even when the product itself can remain stored without continuous heating.
The likely result is a wider separation between origin and delivered prices. Suppliers near Yanbu or inside the Persian Gulf may face rising inventories and pressure to reduce FOB offers if exports slow. Buyers can still receive higher delivered quotations because freight, war-risk insurance, heating, demurrage and voyage duration have increased. A weaker terminal price does not guarantee cheaper material at the asphalt plant when the transportation chain is the principal restriction.
The decline in Yanbu loadings from approximately 3.8 million to 3 million barrels per day is therefore more than a Saudi crude statistic. It indicates that the main bypass created to compensate for Hormuz restrictions is losing efficiency. At the same time, Gulf crude and condensate exports remained around 40% below pre-conflict levels in July, demonstrating that alternative infrastructure and exceptional tanker movements have not restored normal regional export capacity.
The market should now monitor both chokepoints as a connected system. The most important indicators include the number and type of vessels crossing Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, confirmed rather than claimed attack reports, the return of AIS-visible tanker traffic, Yanbu loading volumes, freight validity periods and additional war-risk charges. Bitumen buyers should also watch whether specialized carriers continue accepting fixtures for the Gulf, Red Sea and Gulf of Aden without exceptional cancellation or diversion clauses.
The Red Sea has not formally closed, and Yanbu continues to load cargoes. However, a route does not remain a safe commercial alternative merely because its terminal and navigation channel are technically available. The reduction to one recorded Bab el-Mandeb transit, combined with claimed attacks near Yanbu and in the Gulf of Aden, shows that security risk has spread from the Gulf into the route designed to bypass it.
For bitumen shipping, the consequence is a market with fewer dependable corridors, longer vessel cycles and higher delivered costs. Hormuz can no longer be assessed separately from Bab el-Mandeb, and Yanbu can no longer be treated as an unrestricted substitute for Gulf terminals. Until regular traffic returns through at least one of the two chokepoints, the region’s bitumen trade will remain exposed to simultaneous restrictions at both ends of the route.
By WPB
News, Bitumen, Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb, Yanbu, Strait of Hormuz, Tanker Attacks, War-Risk Insurance, Maritime Logistics, Asphalt Market
