According to WPB, Saudi Arabia plans to raise its crude-oil export capacity through pipelines to as much as 10 million barrels per day over the next two to three years, significantly expanding the kingdom’s ability to move oil without relying on the Strait of Hormuz. The strategy combines the temporary conversion of an existing domestic gas pipeline with upgrades to the East-West crude network and related pumping infrastructure, marking a potentially structural change in the way Saudi Arabia manages export risk during prolonged disruption in the Gulf.
Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman said the kingdom could add up to 1.2 million barrels per day of oil-export capacity within seven to eight weeks by temporarily converting a gas pipeline to crude service. The converted line would remain available for oil transportation only until May 2027, after which it would need to be cleaned and returned to gas service before the summer season.
That first increase should therefore be treated as a temporary contingency measure rather than permanent new crude-pipeline capacity. Its importance lies in how quickly Saudi Arabia could add another 1.2 million barrels per day of overland flexibility during a period when shipping through the Gulf remains exposed to military and insurance risks.
The longer-term plan is more significant. With additional investment in pumping stations and related infrastructure, the kingdom says up to 3 million barrels per day of additional pipeline capacity could ultimately be added. Together with the existing network, Saudi Arabia is targeting total pipeline crude-export capacity of around 10 million barrels per day within two to three years.
The 10 million-barrel target should not be interpreted as a forecast that Saudi Arabia will immediately export 10 million barrels per day through pipelines. It represents potential transportation capacity, while actual flows will depend on crude production, customer demand, terminal capacity, refinery requirements, maintenance and security conditions.
Saudi Arabia already possesses one of the Gulf’s most important alternatives to Hormuz through the East-West Pipeline, which connects crude-producing areas in the east of the kingdom with Yanbu on the Red Sea coast. Saudi Aramco confirmed earlier in 2026 that the system had reached its maximum capacity of approximately 7 million barrels per day during the first quarter as the company increased westbound flows in response to shipping constraints around Hormuz.
The East-West Pipeline has consequently moved from being a strategic backup route to becoming an active part of Saudi export operations during the 2026 conflict. By October 6, Saudi Arabia said flows through the system had reached approximately 5.8 million barrels, while around 4 million barrels per day of crude had been rerouted westward during periods of severe disruption.
The proposed expansion to 10 million barrels per day would materially increase the amount of Saudi crude that could reach the western side of the country without crossing Hormuz. If completed, the system would give Riyadh considerably greater flexibility to allocate barrels between Gulf export terminals and the Red Sea depending on security, freight and customer requirements.
The strategy reflects one of the central lessons of the 2026 crisis: production capacity alone does not guarantee export capacity. Saudi Arabia may have crude available at its fields, but that oil still requires a secure route to international buyers. The disruption of Hormuz has therefore turned pipeline infrastructure into a strategic export asset rather than simply a domestic transportation system.
This distinction became especially visible when Gulf shipping was disrupted earlier in the year. Producers were forced to rely more heavily on pipelines, storage, ship-to-ship transfers and alternative loading locations to maintain exports. Those adaptations helped restore physical flows but also increased operating complexity and transportation costs.
Saudi Arabia’s September export recovery demonstrates how important that flexibility has become. Crude shipments rose sharply to approximately 6.6 million barrels per day during the month as the kingdom restored exports through a combination of Gulf and alternative routes. Saudi barrels also returned to Asian spot markets as refiners searched for more reliable supply during continuing regional disruption.
However, moving crude to the Red Sea does not eliminate maritime risk; it relocates part of it. Crude transported across Saudi Arabia still needs to be loaded onto tankers at Yanbu or another western outlet before reaching most overseas customers.
That limitation has become increasingly important as security conditions in the Red Sea deteriorated. War-risk insurance quotations for Saudi-linked tankers calling at Yanbu rose to around 3% of vessel value in September, while quotations for some Saudi ports closer to Yemen reached considerably higher levels. Attacks on Saudi infrastructure also temporarily interrupted the East-West Pipeline and delayed Yanbu loading operations.
The pipeline was temporarily shut after drone attacks in September before being restarted and progressively returning to high flows. That episode demonstrated that an overland bypass of Hormuz can reduce dependence on one maritime chokepoint without eliminating vulnerability to missile, drone or infrastructure attacks.
Saudi Arabia’s strategy should therefore be described as diversification rather than complete risk removal. A larger East-West system would reduce the kingdom’s dependence on Hormuz, but crude reaching Yanbu would remain exposed to Red Sea security, tanker availability, insurance pricing and Bab el-Mandeb conditions.
This distinction is particularly relevant because shipping and insurance costs have become exceptionally high across petroleum markets. Energy ministers meeting in Riyadh in October warned that transportation and insurance expenses on some energy flows had risen to more than one-third of the underlying commodity value, showing how strongly logistics can affect the economics of exports even when physical oil remains available.
A 10 million-barrel-per-day pipeline network could consequently provide Saudi Arabia with substantial optionality. During periods when Hormuz becomes more dangerous or expensive, more crude could move westward. If Red Sea conditions become less attractive, the kingdom could retain greater flexibility to redirect flows toward Gulf outlets.
The value of that flexibility may extend beyond emergency conditions. Even if security eventually improves, maintaining multiple export corridors can strengthen Saudi Arabia’s position in negotiations with tanker operators, insurers and buyers because the kingdom would not depend as heavily on one route.
The expansion could also reshape crude-trade economics with Asia. Eastbound barrels loaded at Yanbu face a different voyage profile from cargoes loaded at Ras Tanura or other Gulf terminals. Depending on Red Sea security and destination, ships may transit Bab el-Mandeb or take much longer routes, meaning the pipeline advantage can be partly offset by marine freight.
For this reason, pipeline capacity alone does not determine the cheapest export route. The full comparison must include the cost of moving crude across the kingdom, terminal handling, vessel availability, war-risk insurance and the maritime distance between loading point and refinery.
The current plan also has important implications for regional energy security because Saudi Arabia is one of the few Gulf producers capable of diverting several million barrels per day away from Hormuz through existing infrastructure. The UAE also has an alternative outlet at Fujairah, but other major Gulf producers remain much more dependent on the Strait.
Expanding Saudi pipeline capacity to around 10 million barrels per day would therefore widen the difference between producers that possess large-scale bypass infrastructure and those whose exports remain structurally tied to Hormuz. That distinction could become increasingly important if the current security crisis continues or future disruptions recur.
For the bitumen market, however, the implication must be treated more cautiously. The announced 10 million-barrel target applies to crude-oil pipeline capacity and does not create a 10 million-barrel-per-day route for bitumen.
Road bitumen cannot simply be injected into the East-West crude pipeline as a substitute export product. Bitumen requires appropriate storage temperatures, heated tanks, insulated pipelines or transfer systems, specialized loading infrastructure and suitable vessels or packaging before it can be exported commercially.
A crude pipeline reaching Yanbu therefore does not by itself create an alternative bitumen-export corridor around Hormuz. To establish a meaningful western route for bitumen, Saudi Arabia or other producers would require appropriate refinery production, heated storage, dedicated transfer equipment, loading facilities and access to specialized bitumen tankers or packaging operations on the Red Sea coast.
The indirect impact could nevertheless become relevant. Greater crude-routing flexibility can affect which Saudi refineries receive particular crude streams and how the kingdom manages refinery feedstock during disruption. Changes in refinery throughput or crude slate can eventually influence the availability of heavy residual streams used in bitumen production.
That relationship should not be overstated. Higher crude-pipeline capacity does not automatically create higher bitumen output because refinery configuration, vacuum-residue economics, conversion units and product margins determine whether heavy material is ultimately sold as road binder or upgraded into other petroleum products.
For the wider Gulf bitumen market, the most important strategic message is therefore logistical. The 2026 crisis has demonstrated that crude oil and bitumen do not possess the same ability to bypass Hormuz. Saudi Arabia can move millions of barrels of crude overland to Yanbu, while bulk bitumen remains dependent on far more specialized production, storage and shipping infrastructure.
This difference could become increasingly important if Saudi Arabia succeeds in building a 10 million-barrel-per-day crude corridor. The crude market would gain greater physical resilience against Hormuz disruption, while the road-binder market could remain much more dependent on specialized Gulf export routes unless equivalent downstream infrastructure is developed.
The project also illustrates why pipeline announcements must be separated from actual export volumes. The temporary 1.2 million-barrel increase has a defined implementation period of seven to eight weeks, while the larger 10 million-barrel target requires investment and a two-to-three-year development period. Neither figure should be treated as capacity already operating today.
The next indicators to monitor will include completion of the temporary gas-pipeline conversion, actual flows through that line, investment decisions for East-West pumping stations, Yanbu terminal utilization and whether Saudi Arabia maintains high westbound crude flows after Hormuz conditions improve.
Security conditions in the Red Sea will be equally important. If insurance rates remain elevated or infrastructure attacks continue, the commercial advantage of additional pipeline capacity could be partly eroded by higher tanker and protection costs after the crude reaches the western coast.
For bitumen, the relevant indicators will be different. The market should watch for any investment in heated storage or loading capacity on Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast, changes in refinery bitumen production, specialized tanker activity from Yanbu and any evidence that road-binder exports are actually being redirected through western ports.
Until such infrastructure appears, Saudi Arabia’s 10 million-barrel plan should primarily be understood as a major crude-oil security strategy rather than a new bitumen export route.
The development nevertheless carries a broader message for petroleum markets. Saudi Arabia is no longer treating Hormuz disruption solely as a temporary shipping problem and is preparing infrastructure that could permanently increase its ability to move crude around the Strait.
If the full program is completed, the kingdom could emerge from the current crisis with a much larger overland crude-export system and significantly greater flexibility between its eastern and western coasts. For crude oil, that would represent a structural strengthening of Saudi export resilience. For bitumen, the benefits would remain indirect unless specialized downstream logistics are developed alongside the crude pipeline network.
By WPB
Saudi Arabia pipeline, East-West Pipeline, Saudi crude exports, Strait of Hormuz, Hormuz bypass, Yanbu oil exports, Saudi Aramco, oil pipeline capacity, 10 million bpd, Red Sea exports, crude logistics, Saudi energy security, Yanbu terminal, war-risk insurance, Gulf oil exports, bitumen logistics, Saudi bitumen, petroleum infrastructure
