According to WPB, Middle East crude oil exports have recovered strongly enough to exceed pre-war levels on several days, even as attacks on commercial vessels around key regional shipping routes have accelerated. Crude exports reached between 19.5 million and 22.5 million barrels per day on four days during the final week of September, while the seven-day moving average stood at approximately 18.5 million barrels per day on October 1, slightly above the roughly 18 million barrels per day averaged before the regional war began in February.
The recovery marks an important change from the severe disruption seen earlier in 2026, when restrictions around the Strait of Hormuz sharply reduced the amount of crude leaving Gulf producers. It demonstrates that producers, traders and shipping companies have managed to rebuild substantial export capacity through a combination of reopened routes, alternative pipelines, higher tanker deployment and extensive ship-to-ship operations.
However, the latest figures should not be interpreted as evidence that the Strait of Hormuz itself has returned fully to normal. The export data cover crude leaving the broader Middle East through several channels, including the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, direct terminal exports and ship-to-ship transfers in the Gulf of Oman.
This distinction is central to understanding the current market. The region has succeeded in restoring volume, but part of that recovery depends on a more complicated, expensive and operationally fragile logistics system than the one used before the conflict.
Middle East crude exports moved above the pre-war average on September 24 and again between September 27 and 29. On those days, flows ranged from approximately 19.5 million to 22.5 million barrels per day, compared with an average of around 18 million barrels per day between March 2025 and February 2026.
The seven-day moving average of 18.5 million barrels per day on October 1 is therefore particularly significant because it shows that the recovery was not limited to a single unusually large loading day. Export volumes had risen sufficiently across several days to push the short-term average above the pre-war benchmark.
When crude oil, refined petroleum products, chemicals and other non-gas liquids are combined, exports averaged approximately 22.4 million barrels per day during the seven days ending September 30. Liquefied natural gas traffic through Hormuz also strengthened during September and reached its highest monthly level since the war began.
These figures show that energy companies and governments have become increasingly effective at moving cargoes despite severe maritime disruption. The market has adapted operationally to conditions that would normally be expected to remove much larger volumes from international trade.
The mechanisms behind that recovery are nevertheless far less efficient than the pre-war system. Ship-to-ship transfers in the Gulf of Oman have expanded dramatically, Saudi Arabia has alternated between Hormuz and its Red Sea export system, the UAE has relied heavily on infrastructure outside the strait, and tanker owners have adjusted routes and operating patterns according to rapidly changing security conditions.
The expansion of ship-to-ship operations has been particularly important. Gulf producers have increasingly used smaller or shuttle voyages to move crude through high-risk areas before transferring cargoes to larger vessels positioned farther from the most exposed shipping zones.
Such arrangements help maintain physical flows, but they add additional vessel movements, waiting time, coordination requirements and transfer risk. They also increase demand for suitable tanker capacity at precisely the time when many owners remain reluctant to operate in the region.
The recovery in export volume has therefore come with a substantial logistics penalty. Very large crude carrier rates on some Gulf-to-Asia routes have risen to exceptionally high levels, at times exceeding $1 million per day, while insurance, vessel positioning and additional operational costs have added further expense.
This explains why crude oil prices have remained elevated even as exported volumes recover. The market is no longer dealing only with the question of whether barrels physically exist; it is also pricing the cost and reliability of moving those barrels from producer to buyer.
The security side of the equation has meanwhile deteriorated. At least seven recent incidents involving vessels have been reported around the Strait of Hormuz and surrounding waterways, creating a striking contrast with the recovery in export volumes.
One of the most significant incidents involved the very large crude carrier Kazimah III, which was reportedly struck by an unidentified projectile while operating in the Strait of Hormuz on October 1. The strike caused a fire aboard the tanker, although the crew was reported safe and subsequently evacuated.
The vessel had previously discharged approximately 2 million barrels of Kuwaiti crude at Ras Markaz in Oman. The incident therefore involved a major crude carrier operating directly within the regional oil logistics network rather than a small commercial vessel with limited connection to energy trade.
Maritime authorities have subsequently reported additional incidents around regional shipping lanes. From October 2 onward, reports of attacks have emerged on an almost daily basis across the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Aden area, reinforcing the view that physical traffic recovery has not been accompanied by a comparable improvement in maritime security.
One possible explanation raised by maritime intelligence analysts is that some recent incidents may not involve the deliberate selection of individual merchant vessels. Missiles or other weapons may instead be launched into predetermined engagement areas where the presence of a commercial ship at the wrong time is itself enough to create exposure.
If this assessment is correct, the risk for shipping becomes particularly difficult to price. A tanker may face danger not because of its owner, cargo or destination, but simply because it occupies a particular section of water when weapons are active.
That uncertainty is highly significant for insurers and shipowners. Traditional risk assessment relies partly on identifying whether a vessel has specific political, national or commercial characteristics that make it more likely to be targeted. A less discriminating threat environment makes that analysis considerably harder.
The increase in attacks also challenges the assumption that more tanker movements will automatically reduce freight and insurance premiums. Greater traffic can demonstrate that the route remains physically usable, but it also places more vessels inside an active threat environment.
Before the conflict, approximately 125 large commercial vessels normally crossed the Strait of Hormuz each day. These included crude tankers, product tankers, LNG carriers, bulk carriers and container vessels, while the waterway handled roughly one-fifth of the world’s daily crude oil and LNG movements.
Current flows remain structurally different from that pre-war environment. Crude transportation has recovered much more quickly than some refined-product flows, and a significant portion of regional trade now relies on alternative routing and extraordinary logistical arrangements.
The distinction between crude and petroleum products is particularly important. The return of crude exports does not mean diesel, gasoline, jet fuel or other petroleum products have recovered to the same extent.
That mismatch has become one of the defining characteristics of the current energy crisis. Crude can once again leave the Middle East in large volumes, but damaged or constrained refining capacity means the international market can still face severe shortages of finished products.
This helps explain why governments have moved toward emergency releases of diesel as well as crude oil. The bottleneck has increasingly shifted from upstream production to refining and transportation.
The latest export figures therefore carry two apparently contradictory messages. The first is that the Middle East energy system has demonstrated much greater resilience than initially expected. Producers have found ways to restore crude flows to levels equal to or greater than those seen before the conflict.
The second is that the system has become much more expensive and vulnerable in the process. It now depends on high freight rates, additional vessel movements, complex transfer operations, alternative pipelines and exposure to repeated attacks.
That distinction is essential for interpreting the effect on oil prices. A market can have sufficient physical crude supply and still maintain a substantial geopolitical premium if delivery remains costly, unpredictable or vulnerable to interruption.
Saudi Arabia illustrates this dynamic particularly clearly. Its crude-export system has repeatedly shifted between the Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman ship-to-ship transfers and the East-West Pipeline to Yanbu as different routes became more or less usable.
The return of Yanbu has restored some western export capacity, but Red Sea shipping itself has faced higher war-risk insurance costs and new security threats. As a result, the existence of an alternative route does not necessarily mean the alternative is cheap or low-risk.
The UAE has a different advantage because its Fujairah export infrastructure sits outside the Strait of Hormuz. This gives the country greater ability to bypass the chokepoint, although wider Gulf shipping, storage and bunker markets remain connected to regional security conditions.
Iraq faces a more difficult structural position because most of its southern crude exports depend on access from Basra through Hormuz. Recent successful movements, including a 2-million-barrel cargo transported by the state tanker company, confirm that large Iraqi crude shipments can still leave the Gulf, but they do not eliminate the country’s strategic dependence on the strait.
The interaction of these national strategies explains why total Middle Eastern exports can recover even when the security environment remains severely disrupted. Producers are no longer relying on one standardized export pattern.
Instead, the region is operating a patchwork of direct Hormuz passages, pipelines, Red Sea terminals, Fujairah exports, shuttle tankers and offshore transfers. The system works, but its complexity creates cost and execution risk.
This increased complexity also affects tanker availability. A voyage that once required one tanker and a predictable transit may now require multiple vessels, additional transfer operations or longer waiting periods.
The same quantity of exported crude can therefore consume more shipping capacity than before the war. This is one reason tanker rates can remain high even when headline export volumes look strong.
Longer vessel cycles also reduce effective fleet availability. If a tanker spends additional days waiting for an escort, transfer slot, insurance confirmation or safe transit window, it cannot immediately return for another cargo.
The resulting market can show high exports and high freight simultaneously. That would normally appear contradictory, but under current conditions it reflects the difference between physical oil availability and transportation efficiency.
Insurance remains another key constraint. Repeated vessel attacks make it difficult for underwriters to reduce war-risk premiums simply because more ships are successfully completing voyages.
A successful passage demonstrates that transportation is possible; it does not demonstrate that the probability of loss has returned to normal. The seven recent incidents underline this difference.
Shipowners may therefore continue demanding substantial compensation for Gulf exposure. Some may accept the higher risk in exchange for exceptional charter rates, while others may refuse the trade entirely.
This segmentation reduces the effective pool of available ships. A global tanker may technically be open for employment, but if its owner will not enter Hormuz it does not contribute to the relevant regional capacity.
The same logic applies to crews. Shipowners also have to consider personnel safety, contractual obligations, crew consent, emergency response capabilities and the consequences of operating repeatedly through an active conflict zone.
The latest attacks may consequently slow the decline in freight costs that would normally be expected after export volumes stabilize. Higher traffic alone is not enough to normalize the shipping market if the probability of attack remains elevated.
For energy buyers in Asia, this creates an important distinction between crude price and delivered crude cost. A producer may discount its official selling price, but some or all of that benefit can be consumed by freight, insurance and operational costs.
Saudi Arabia’s recent decision to reduce November crude prices to Asian customers illustrates this pressure. The discount comes in an environment where unusually high tanker costs have reduced the competitiveness of Gulf barrels despite strong physical export recovery.
This also explains why shipping has become a larger part of oil-market economics. Freight was historically a meaningful but relatively predictable component of delivered crude prices. During the current disruption it has become one of the dominant variables.
For the global market, that means traditional supply figures need to be interpreted differently. Seeing Middle East exports above 18 million barrels per day no longer automatically means the supply problem has been solved.
The actual question is how much of that volume can be delivered repeatedly, safely and at a commercially sustainable cost. A system dependent on extraordinary freight rates and complex transfers can maintain volume for some time but remain vulnerable to another security shock.
The recent attacks demonstrate that vulnerability. A major casualty, successful strike on a loaded tanker, disruption to a transfer area or withdrawal of a major group of shipowners could quickly reduce effective export capacity even if production remains unchanged.
This distinction is equally important for the bitumen market. The recovery in Middle East crude exports should not be interpreted as evidence that bitumen exports or specialized bitumen shipping have returned to pre-war conditions.
Bulk bitumen is normally transported in specialized heated tankers that represent a much smaller and less flexible fleet than the global VLCC market. Crude-tanker availability therefore cannot be directly converted into bitumen-tanker availability.
The operating requirements are also different. Bitumen must be maintained at elevated temperature during storage and transportation, requiring heated tanks, specialized pumping systems and vessels capable of handling high-viscosity cargo.
A VLCC that becomes available after carrying crude cannot simply substitute for a heated bitumen tanker. The two segments of the shipping market therefore respond differently to changes in regional traffic.
The current recovery can nevertheless have indirect implications for bitumen logistics. If maritime conditions become more predictable, insurance becomes easier to obtain and general congestion declines, specialized petroleum-product vessels may also benefit.
The opposite is equally possible. If rising crude exports absorb port capacity, anchorage space, support services and regional tanker resources while attacks continue, specialized smaller vessels may still face high operating costs.
This is particularly relevant around the Gulf of Oman, where rapid expansion of ship-to-ship crude transfers has already placed pressure on offshore logistics. Congestion in those areas can affect tug availability, bunkering, agency services, anchorage and other infrastructure used by different parts of the petroleum shipping market.
For bitumen exporters in the Gulf, freight therefore remains a critical variable. Even where refinery production is available, a shortage of suitable heated tonnage or high war-risk costs can prevent competitively priced material from reaching India, Southeast Asia, Africa or other destinations.
The headline recovery in Middle East crude exports should consequently be viewed as evidence of logistics adaptation rather than complete logistics normalization.
For bitumen pricing, the most useful indicators remain actual specialized tanker availability, freight quotations, insurance costs, Gulf port congestion and the number of physical bitumen cargoes reaching importing markets.
The security environment could also affect packaged bitumen differently from bulk cargoes. Drummed or bagged bitumen may move through container or conventional cargo networks and therefore faces a different set of vessel, port and insurance constraints from heated bulk shipments.
As a result, the same regional security event can produce different effects across bulk, drum, jumbo-bag and other bitumen trade flows.
The recovery in crude exports nevertheless provides an important macro signal. It shows that regional producers have been capable of adapting infrastructure and shipping practices quickly enough to avoid the catastrophic loss of oil supply that was initially feared.
What it does not show is that these flows are economically or operationally equivalent to pre-war trade. The cost structure, route complexity and security exposure remain substantially different.
The seven-day crude export average of approximately 18.5 million barrels per day should therefore be read together with the seven reported maritime incidents rather than separately. One figure describes physical resilience; the other describes the continuing fragility behind that resilience.
If attacks diminish while export volumes remain high, the market could begin moving toward genuine normalization. Insurance premiums could ease, more shipowners could return and freight rates could decline as effective vessel availability improves.
If attacks continue or intensify, the opposite may occur. The region could maintain high crude-export volumes while transportation becomes even more expensive, forcing producers to absorb logistics costs, discount crude more aggressively or use increasingly complicated routes.
For the bitumen market, the second scenario would be more important than the headline crude volume. High Middle East exports would provide little direct relief if specialized tanker freight and insurance remained elevated.
The next indicators to watch are therefore not simply barrels leaving the Middle East. The market should monitor the frequency and severity of vessel attacks, actual Hormuz traffic, Gulf of Oman transfer congestion, VLCC and product-tanker freight, war-risk premiums and the availability of specialized heated tonnage.
Until those indicators improve together, the latest export recovery should be understood as a remarkable restoration of physical crude flows under abnormal conditions rather than a return to the pre-war shipping environment. Middle East producers have restored volume, but the seven recent maritime incidents show that they have not yet restored security.
By WPB
Middle East crude exports, Strait of Hormuz, tanker attacks, Gulf shipping, crude oil exports, tanker freight, maritime security, Gulf of Oman, ship-to-ship transfer, VLCC rates, war-risk insurance, Saudi oil exports, Iraq oil exports, UAE crude exports, Hormuz traffic, bitumen shipping, bitumen freight, heated bitumen tanker
